Factors affecting the self-esteem hypothesis : self-serving biases in the intergroup situation by Donaldson, Sandra J. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
INFORMATION TO USERS 
1bis manuscript _has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer. 
1be quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely_ event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
conrim1ing from left to right in equal ser.tions with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order. 
UMI 
A Bell & Howell tnformat1on Company 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml48106-1346 USA 
313!761-4700 800.'521-0600 

FACI'ORS AFFECTING THE SELF-ESTEEM 
HYPOTHESIS: SELF-SERVING BIASES 
IN THE INTERGROUP SITUATION 
by 
Sandra J. Donaldson 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of The Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Greensboro 
1995 
Approved by 
UMI Number: 9531831 
UMI Microform 9531831 
Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. 
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
UMI 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the 
Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
Dissertation Advisor 
Committee Members 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
ii 
DONALDSON, SANDRA J.,. Ph.D. Factors Affecting the Self-Esteem Hypothesis: Self-
Serving Biases in the Intergroup Situation. (1995) 
Directed by Dr. John J. Seta. 81pp. 
The purpose of this research was to assess whether an individual's engagement of 
self-serving strategies was dependent upon (a) one's level of self-esteem, (b) the stability 
of one's self-esteem, and (c) the relevance or importance of the evaluative feedback. 
The research was tested using an intergroup paradigm, as supporting evidence within this 
paradigm had demonstrated that only high self-esteem individuals were capable of 
engaging in self-enhancing strategies or intergroup bias when their self view was 
threatened with negative evaluative feedback. One-hundred and eighty female college 
students comprised the sample. 
The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance provided converging evidence that both high 
and low self-esteem individuals are capable of engaging in self-serving strategies but it 
depends on a combination of factors. When performance feedback is negative and 
related to one's intelligence and creative ability, low self-esteem individuals do not 
demonstrate the same engagement of self-serving strategies as demonstrated by high self-
esteem individuals. When negative performance feedback does not implicate one's 
intellectual or creative ability, low self esteem individuals are capable of engaging in self-
serving strategies. The ability to engage in self-serving strategies was further related to 
the stability of self-esteem with unstable high self-esteem being the most reactive to 
evaluative feedback that implicates their intellectual and creative ability. These results 
were demonstrated most effectively when direct measures were used to assess self-serving 
biases within individuals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCI'ION 
1 
Although there is no one agreed upon definition of the self, most agree that there 
are two components of the self: self knowledge and self evaluation. Self knowledge 
consists of the beliefs held about oneself, or one's 'self view'. Self-esteem is an 
evaluative term used to reflect the individual's feelings or generalized expectancy about 
one's self worth (Shrauger, 1975). Considered to be relatively stable, these feelings can 
fluctuate around a baseline level. 
Research on self-esteem tends to focus on the stable characteristic differences 
between individuals with favorable evaluations of the self (high self-esteem) versus 
unfavorable evaluations (low self-esteem). Because protecting and maintaining self-
esteem is considered by many theorists to be the fundamental guide of social behavior 
(Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1993), a great deal of research also focuses on the need 
for self-esteem as a motivator of and explanation for behavior, the 'self-esteem 
hypothesis' (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Thus, differences between high and low self-esteem 
include not only characteristic differences regarding individuals' self views but also 
differences in individual actions to maintain those beliefs. 
High self-esteem is generally believed to be a desirable, adaptive state related to 
healthy behavior, good adjustment, and self-acceptance. These individuals are less 
influenced by external sources of self-relevant information (Frey & Carlock, 1989). 
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Because more positive aspects of their self image are accessible, they are less reactive to 
negative self information. High self-esteem, and positive changes in self-e~teem, increase 
positive emotions as well as security (Epstein, 1976); and people with high self-esteem are 
usually more apt at displaying self-enhancement behavior (Swann, 1983; Swann, Griffin, 
Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). High self-esteem individuals are considered to be 'masters 
of their environment' as they have greater expectations to succeed (Baumeister, 
Heatherton & Tice, 1993). 
Low self-esteem, on the other hand, is generally considered maladaptive, as it has 
been found to be associated with higher levels of anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1992), 
unhappiness (Epstein, 1976), and depression (Tennen & Herzberger, 1987; Becker, 1979). 
Individuals with low self-esteem are generally believed to experience self-rejection, self-
dissatisfaction, self-contempt, and self-disparagement (Rosenberg, 1965; Frey & Carlock, 
1989). Poorly developed self-schemas result in low self-esteem individuals having fewer 
and less distinct positive aspects of their self feelings (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 
1990). Because of this, individuals with low self-esteem are more susceptible to external 
information and have more intense, negative reactions towards negative feedback (Kernis, 
1993; Moreland & Sweeney, 1984). Rather than focusing on engaging in behaviors that 
would increase the positivity of their self-esteem, low self-esteem individuals seem to 
; 
i 
engage in self-protective behaviors that will reduce the negative affect associated with 
their low self view. When faced with negative self-relevant information, they are more 
likely to engage in downward comparison, and use stereotypes or display prejudices 
(Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). Unlike high self-esteem individuals, it has also been 
demonstrated that low self-esteem individuals fail to show self-enhancement or self-
3 
serving biases (see Taylor & Brown 1988, for a review; Crocker et al., 1987; Crocker & 
Luhtanen, 1990; Seta & Seta, 1992; Seta & Seta, in press; Swann et al., 1987). 
The distinction between high and low self-esteem, however, is not so clearly defined 
as one might infer from the aforementioned discussion. Within these distinctions of high 
and low self-esteem is the position that low self-esteem is inherently unstable due to the 
susceptibility towards external self-relevant cues. However, instability is not strictly 
associated with low self-esteem. Rosenberg (1965, 1979) stated that stability reflects 
psychological processes which are distinct from level of self-esteem. Individuals not only 
have global self evaluations, but these evaluations may show short term fluctuations or 
instability. Research, in fact, indicates that stability of self-esteem is an important 
psychological variable that can moderate differences between, and within, self-esteem 
levels (Baumgardner, 1990; Frey & Carlock, 1989; Kemis, Granneman & Mathis, 1989; 
Kemis et al., 1993; Kemis, 1993; Savin-Williams & Demo, 1983). 
Kernis and his colleagues (1989; 1993) have investigated the importance of stability 
of self-esteem as a moderating variable of self-esteem. Stability of self-esteem is the 
"magnitucl.e of fluctuations in momentary, contextually based self-esteem", (Kemis et al., 
1993, pg 1190) and represents the variability in self feelings across time, with both high 
and low self-esteem individuals experiencing such fluctuations. Within low self-esteem, 
such fluctuations entail the chance of occasionally experiencing favorable feelings about 
oneself. Instability within high self-esteem entails more vulnerability to negative feelings 
about oneself. Whereas unstable low self-esteem individuals have the hope of increasing 
the positive nature of their self view, unstable high self-esteem individuals are faced with 
the potential of a drop in low self-esteem (Baumeister, 1993). 
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Explanations for Self-Serving Strategies 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the differing patterns of self-serving 
strategies employed by high and low self-esteem individuals in reaction to evaluative 
feedback (cf. Shrauger, 1975). Evaluative feedback provides consistent or inconsistent 
information about an individual's competence or capabilities. Inconsistent information 
can lead one to engage in self-protective or self-enhancing strategies in order to avoid 
a loss of self-esteem. At the core of these distinctions are two competing theories: self-
consistency and self-enhancement theory. According to self-enhancement theory, people 
are motivated to maintain a positive self view. When faced with negative self-relevant 
information, they will engage in strategies designed to alleviate the negative affect 
produced by the threatening information. Those individuals already experiencing a high 
level of unpleasant arousal, resulting from a low self image, should find almost any 
additional stimulation aversive, and, therefore, should be motivated to defend themselves 
against such stimulation (Epstein, 1976). Thus, low self-esteem individuals are believed 
to distort and bias self-relevant information in order to increase the positive nature of 
their negative self view and alleviate negative affect. On the other hand, self-consistency 
theory suggests that people engage in self-serving strategies that will maintain the 
consistency of their self view. Thus, high self-esteem individuals are more apt to display 
distortions of negative self-relevant information, and low self-esteem should distort 
positive information. These predictions follow from the assumption that both high and 
low self-esteem individuals attempt to maintain a consistency between the type of 
information and their self concept. 
In an attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between these competing views, several 
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explanations have been proffered. One explanation is that some dependent measures 
(cognitive) support a self-consistency position and some measures (affective) support a 
self-enhancement position (Shrauger, 1975; Swann et al., 1987; and Kernis et al., 1993). 
Cognitive reactions to feedback include perceived competence and attractiveness of the 
evaluator as well as perceived accuracy or diagnositicity of the task. Affective reactions 
would include measures of mood states such as levels of anxiety and hostility. According 
to self-consistency theory, people's reactions are more likely to be driven by the 
consistency of the self-relevant information to one's self view. Thus, high self-esteem 
individuals regard success feedback as more accurate and self-descriptive whereas low 
self-esteem individuals regard failure feedback as more accurate and self-descriptive. 
According to self-enhancement theory, even though low self-esteem individuals find 
negative feedback to be accurate and self-descriptive, they should also be more anxious 
and hostile and engage in self-enhancing strategies to increase the positivity of that view. 
Swann et al. (1987) found this to be the case, except that the affective reactions of high 
and low self-esteem individuals did not differ. He concluded that affective measures 
offered weak support for self-enhancement strategies. 
Kernis et al. (1993) also examined cognitive and emotional reactions to evaluative 
feedback due to level of self-esteem. Using a similar methodology to that of Swann et 
al. (1987), they proposed that in order to understand reactions to evaluative feedback it 
is also necessary to incorporate the stability of that self view into a theory about self-
esteem reactions to evaluative feedback. The instability of high or low self-esteem 
indicates that one is uncertain of their positive or negative self view. Kernis et al. (1993) 
found that self-esteem instability was related to a greater perceived accuracy of the task. 
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Instability among high self-esteem individuals was found to be related to more favorable 
reactions to positive feedback, including viewing the feedback as more accurate and 
experiencing more positive affect. When negative feedback was received, instability 
among high self-esteem individuals was associated with more defensive reactions including 
derogation of the evaluator and the evaluative technique. Instability among low self-
esteem individuals was related to greater perceived accuracy of the negative feedback but 
with less defensive reactions in comparison to stable low self-esteem individuals. These 
results are consistent with Kernis' previous correlational research employing Rosenberg's 
Self-Esteem and Stability Scales. In that study, unstable high self-esteem was indicative 
of having a greater propensity to experience anger and express hostility (Kernis et al., 
1989). 
The aforementioned studies have dealt with the self-serving behaviors of the 
individual when his or her personal identity is threatened. When the individual fails, 
unstable high self-esteem individuals demonstrate the most hostile, self-serving reactions. 
Research to date, however, has not looked at the influence of self-esteem instability 
within a group context where -one's social identity is threatened. For instance, would 
unstable high self-esteem individuals engage in self-serving strategies in a situation where 
their group fails. If stability and level of one's self-esteem are related to the actions of 
the individual when faced with negative self-relevant information, then Kernis's approach 
might be important in understanding how self-esteem influences a person's evaluation of 
his or her group. This is particularly interesting because the issue of how self-esteem 
influences an individual's evaluation of his or her group is an issue which has been 
explored in the area of intergroup behavior. 
J 
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Self-Serving Strategies and Intergroup Behavior 
Henri Tajfel (1959, 1978, 1981) developed a social self-enhancement model of 
intergroup behavior in which self-esteem is referred to as the motivation for intergroup 
discrimination. According to this model, social memberships contribute to some aspects 
of an individual's self knowledge or one's 'social identity'. Social identity is defined by 
Tajfel as "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of 
his membership of a social group (groups) toge~her with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership," (Tajfel, 1981 pg. 255). Being a member of a 
social category (group) result:i in an individual perceiving his or her group as being 
positively distinct from other groups. Such a perception helps an individual obtain or 
maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981). Because 
belonging to a social category contributes to one's social identity, then the need for self-
enhancement would motivate a desire to positively evaluate that category. Thus, 
according to Tajfel's model, ingroup bias, or the favoritism of one's own group over 
another group, is a function of one's need for self-enhancement or achieving positive 
self-esteem. The favoritism for one's own group over another group exists not only when 
group membership is meaningful or important but also when group membership is 
arbitrarily determined, such as by the toss of a coin (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Billig & Tajfel, 
1973). 
If patterns of intergroup bias are related to self-esteem motives, then intergroup 
bias should have different patterns of results for high and low self-esteem individuals. 
According to Wills (1981), individuals low in self-esteem should be more likely to display 
intergroup bias as they have a greater need for self-enhancement. Wills' theory of 
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downward comparison suggests that people experiencing negative affect from having a 
low self view can enhance their self-esteem through a favorable comparison to les~ 
fortunate others. These comparisons can occur on a passive basis (taking advantage of 
a less fortunate's situation) or on an active basis (the derogation of others). Yet 
evidence for this type of reactivity by low self-esteem individuals has not been clearly 
demonstrated within experimental intergroup research. 
Correlational evidence demonstrates that low self-esteem individuals display more 
prejudice in terms of expressing more hostile racial attitudes than high self-esteem 
individuals (see Ehrlich, 1973; Wills, 1981; Wylie, 1979). Laboratory research indicates 
that high self-esteem individuals are more likely to engage in intergroup bias in terms of 
maximizing differences between groups when one group succeeds over the other.1 A 
study by Crocker & Schwartz (1985) did find that individuals with low self-esteem rated 
the outgroup more negatively than high self-esteem individuals. However, there is no 
evidence of ingroup favoritism in that the rating of the outgroup was not relative to the 
rating of the ingroup. Opposite to this view, researchers (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Crocker 
et al., 1987; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Seta & Seta, 1992 and, in press) have found that 
it is high levels of self-esteem that produce greater discrimination in situations where the 
Generally, ingroup favoritism exists when, under conditions favorable to the ingroup, 
the differences between the groups are maximized; under conditions that are unfavorable 
to the ingroup, the differences between the groups are minimized (see Brewer, 1979; Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988; Turner & Oakes, 1989). The favorableness of the comparison dimension 
is typically manipulated by providing positive and/or negative group performance outcomes 
(see Brewer, 1979 for review). In situations where individuals are members of successful 
groups, they will maximize the difference of their evaluations of the ingroup relative to the 
outgroup. When one is a member of an unsuccessful group, the difference in evaluations 
of the groups is minimized. 
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rating of the outgroup is relative to the ingroup. 
One explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the intergroup bias literature is 
that both high and low self-esteem individuals engage in self-enhancement strategies but 
in a different manner (Brown et al., 1988) and under different conditions. According 
to Brown et al., (1988), high self-esteem individuals use direct forms of self-enhancement 
such as claiming to be superior when comparing oneself to others. Since low self-esteem 
individuals believe a positive identity would be difficult or impossible to maintain, they 
engage in indirect or 'roundabout' forms of self-enhancement. This includes 'aligning 
themselves' with others that succeed and 'distancing themselves' from those who fail. 
This explanation is consistent with Wills' (1981) theory of downward comparison which 
suggests there are active (derogation of others) and passive (taking advantage of a less 
fortunate other's situation) forms of self-enhancement. In their research, Brown et al., 
(1988) found greater ingroup favoritism by high self-esteem than low self-esteem 
participants when comparing the merits of one's own group's performance (own-group) 
to the performance of the other group in the room (out-group). However, when 
comparing the merits of another group's performance who has the same label as one's 
own group (in-group) to an out-group's performance, low self-esteem individuals 
demonstrated greater intergroup bias. Brown et al., (1988) argued that active 
involvement in the group is an important factor for direct and indirect self-enhancement 
to occur. It could also be argued that when the performance outcome of the group 
includes personally relevant information (one's own performance) it is more important 
and self-relevant than when personal feedback is not included. 
Blaine & Crocker (1993) point out that distortions of self-relevant information 
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depends on the relevance of that information to the individual. Individuals will "distort 
information in a self-serving manner when unconstrained by what they believe to be true 
of themselves" (pg. 60). This is consistent with other views (Brown et al., 1988; Taylor 
& Brown, 1988) which imply that low self-esteem individuals are incapable of engaging 
in direct forms of self-enhancement due to reality constraints. Since distortion of self-
relevant information depends on the relevance of the information to the individual, then 
it would follow that the importance or diagnosticity of the task to one's self concept might 
also be an important factor to consider. Previous research which investigated the 
relationship of self-serving strategies and reactions to evaluative feedback has typically 
employed a task which purports to measure either social aptitude (Crocker et al, 1987; 
Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Seta & Seta, 1992, and in press), social sensitivity (Shrauger 
& Rosenberg, 1970), social competence (Swann et al., 1987; Kernis et al., 1993) and 
creative ability (Taylor & Brown, 1988). These tasks could be considered highly relevant 
to or diagnostic (important) of one's self concept. One possibility is that receiving highly 
relevant, negative information about oneself would impede low self-esteem individuals 
from engaging in self-serving strategies because the information is extremely threatening 
to one's self view. Thus, although motivated to increase the positivity of that low self 
view, the severity of the highly relevant, negative information constrains low self-esteem 
individuals from being able to engage in self-enhancement strategies. However, it may 
be the case that if you lessen the severity of the threat by indicating that, although they 
failed, the task is unimportant or less relevant to one's self concept then, not only are 
they motivated to self-enhance but they are also capable. Whether the task is highly self-
relevant or not should have little constraining effects on a positive self view engaging in 
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self-serving strategies. 
In addition to varying the relevance of the feedback to one's self view, the effect 
of stability of self-esteem within the intergroup situation has not been considered in any 
of these views. Instability has been found to moderate the reactivity of high and low self-
esteem individuals in evaluative situations (see Kernis, 1993 for a review). Instability 
among high self-esteem individuals is related to a greater tendency toward self-
enhancement in response to positive evaluations. Because their self view is fragile, 
though positive, unstable high self-esteem individuals should demonstrate greater evidence 
of self-enhancement than a stable positive self view. In the intergroup situation, you 
would expect to find a greater maximization of group differences by unstable high self-
esteem individuals relative to stable high self-esteem when the performance outcome of 
the ingroup is positive. When faced with negative self-relevant information, unstable high 
self-esteem individuals react with greater defensiveness and adverse reactions. This could 
result in two types of outcomes in the intergroup situation. One reaction would be to 
minimize the differences between the failing ingroup and the outgroup. However, 
another reaction, might be to distort the importance of doing well on the task as well as 
distort the perceived accuracy of the task, thereby 'undermining the threat's legitimacy' 
(Kernis et al., 1993 pg. 1191) and indicating the engagement of self-serving strategies. 
The validity of a task should be uninfluenced by whether an individual has failed or 
succeeded: a task measures what it purports to measure regardless of how well or how 
poorly an individual performs. If the assessment of the accuracy of the task is affected 
by feedback about their performance, this would provide supporting evidence that self-
serving strategies were employed. 
12 
Instability within an already low self view is related to avoiding the permanence of 
that low self view. Being a member of a successful group then would allow unstable low 
self-esteem individuals a chance to enhance the positivity of their low self view. Stable 
low self-esteem individuals, on the other hand, would find being a member of a successful 
group inconsistent with their low self view and therefore would reject or devalue the 
positive self-relevant information. Low self-esteem instability is also associated with 
greater self-protective efforts in response to negative events but not in the form of 
defensive reactions toward others. Thus, in the intergroup situation, these individuals 
should be evenhanded in their ratings of groups. However, their rating of their own 
failing group should be higher than unstable high self-esteem, as their reaction towards 
the source of the evaluation is not a defensive response. Consistent with predictions of 
high self-esteem individuals, another reaction would be to distort the importance of doing 
well on the task as well as the validity ascribed to the assessment of that task after failure 
(success). However, opposite to high self-esteem individuals who are likely to engage in 
this self-serving strategy when the feedback is highly self-relevant, low self-esteem 
individuals will react in this manner when the task is not self-relevant. This is because, 
under conditions of highly relevant, negative feedback, low self-esteem individuals are 
constrained from being able to engage in self-serving strategies. When the feedback is 
less relevant to one's self view, the negative feedback is not as threatening allowing for 
low self-esteem individuals to engage in self-enhancing strategies in order to increase the 
positivity of their self view. 
The following research was designed to provide converging tests of these 
hypotheses. Direct measures of self-serving strategies include one's perception of the 
! ' ' 
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importance of performing well on the task as well as the perceived accuracy of the task 
assessments. Less direct measures of self-serving strategies include affective measures 
in addition to intergroup bias effects. In order to manipulate the relevance or importance 
of the performance feedback to one's self concept, a symbol task was employed. 
2 
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CHAPfER2 
METIIOD 
Subject Selection: This study was interested in identifying stable and unstable high 
and low self-esteemed individuals. During mass screening, 912 female students over three 
consecutive semesters were administered the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965) and 
the Rosenberg Stability Scale (1979). The Self-Esteem Scale is a 10 item Likert type scale 
with each item having four possible responses: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly 
disagree. These responses, rated 1 to 4, have possible scores ranging from 10 to 40, with 
40 representing the highest level of self-esteem. The Stability Scale consists of five 
questions with a possible score ranging from 0, representing extreme instability, to 5, 
representing extreme stability. 
Students who scored 2 or 3 on the Stability Scale were identified in this study as 
"unstable", and "stable" if they scored 4 or 5.2 Students were considered having "high 
self-esteem" with a score of 32 or greater and "low self-esteem" with a score of 30 or less 
based on the Self-Esteem Scale.3 Thus, four groups of potential participants were 
Scores of 0 or 1 were excluded due to the low frequency of occurrence and extreme 
skewness towards stability ( -.8). 
Kernis et al. (1993) used a regression analysis on the full range of self-esteem and 
stability scores. Swann et al. (1987) selected subjects using those who scored on the 
extreme ends of the scale. Since the interest of this study was the reactions of high or low 
self-esteem participants, subjects with a score of 31 (the median) were excluded. We did 
this for two reasons. First, as suggested by Baumeister (1993), self-esteem is positively 
skewed. Accordingly, the hypothesis explored in this paper relates most directly to those 
t.· 
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identified: unstable low self-esteem, unstable high self-esteem, stable low self-esteem, and 
stable high self-esteem. 
To maintain anonymity of the student's identity, the social security numbers of 
potential participants were posted indicating eligibility for participation in this study. Due 
to the small number of stable low self-esteem and unstable high self-esteem individuals 
within this population, it was necessary to repeat this selection process across three 
semesters. [There was no change in the populations over the semesters as indicated by 
Table 1, Descriptive Statistics.] In all, 180 females participated in this study in partial 
fulfillment of research requirements. Only female students were used because they 
represent the majority of the subject pool and to maintain homogeneity of the 
experimental groups. Participants were run in groups ranging in size from 5 to 16. 
Design: The factorial design of this study included 2 levels of global self-esteem 
(high and low) x 2 levels of self-esteem stability (stable and unstable) x 2 types of group 
task feedback (success and failure) x 2 levels of self-relevance of task feedback 
(important and unimportant) as between factors. 
Procedure: To establish a minimal intergroup situation, upon arrival, participants 
were asked to select a folded piece of paper (A or B) from a box and to sit at the table 
which corresponded to their selection. They were told this selection process was to allow 
for the random assignment of individuals to either Group A or Group B. This procedure 
resulted in two groups (A and B) sitting at large tables facing one another. 
participants having relatively extreme personality scores. Therefore, consistent with Swann 
et al. (1987), we have also used an analysis of variance (ANOVA) as the form of analysis, 
treating stability and self-esteem as between factors. 
16 
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate how personal 
perceptions are related to group behavior. For the purpose of matching current 
information with information obtained during mass screening, it was necessary for 
students to write their social security number on all items during the experiment. They 
were reassured that only the experimenter would be able to identify the information and 
that all information would remain confidential and anonymous. 
After informed consent, participants were asked to fill out a group of forms. [See 
Appendix B for a copy of all materials.] The forms consisted of the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale, the Rosenberg Stability Scale, and a self-reported measure of their feelings 
at that moment. Although subjects were pre-assessed and identified on the dimension 
of global self-esteem and stability of self-esteem, these scales were re-administered at the 
time of the experimentation to insure the consistency and reliability of the scales. The 
measure of their feelings at that moment was used to establish a baseline measure of 
anxiety and hostility. The measure consisted of ten adjectives selected from the Multiple 
Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman, 1960; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). The 
10 adjectives represented hostility (afraid, fearful, amiable, frightened, and disagreeable) 
and anxiety (angry, calm, mad, nervous, and cooperative). These 10 traits were 
embedded within two different lists containing 14 additional neutral traits. Two lists were 
used: one to establish an initial baseline measure and the other to measure a change in 
anxiety and hostility due to the manipulation [See Appendix B for two lists of traits]. The 
order of these lists were counterbalanced across subjects. Subjects rated each adjective 
on a 7 point scale (1 being not at all characteristic of how I feel now and 7 being very 
characteristic). This measure has been successfully used in previous research (e.g., 
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Greenberg et al., 1992; Kemis et al., 1993; Swan et al., 1987; Testa & Majors, 1990). 
The target traits were scored by reversing the score of the positive traits and tallying a 
separate total score for anxiety and for hostility. 
Participants were then handed an instruction sheet accompanying a task. Because 
all experimental conditions were represented in each group, experimental instructions 
were given in written form along with. neutral verbal instructions to facilitate 
understanding. They were reminded that this experiment involves being a member of 
Group A or B which consisted of approximately eight members. To maintain perceptual 
consistency of group size, participants were told that their group not only consisted of 
people in this room but people in other sessions as well. 
Participants assigned to the 'important' condition read the following: 
You and your group have been given the Berkeley Abstract Reasoning Task, 
otherwise known as the BART. This task was developed to assess abstract 
reasoning ability and overall intelligence. The BART has been found to be 
a reliable indicator of people's ability to process abstract symbols and 
integrate information to make perceptual judgments. The BART also 
assesses overall intellectual ability. 
Participants led to believe the task was unimportant were told they had been given "a 
symbol task", that "this task has no implications for personal abilities" and is "not related 
to abstract reasoning ability or overall intelligence." They were told it was a filler task 
sometimes used in experiments and we wanted to get their reaction to the task. 
The task actually was a bogus task successfully employed in previous research (Seta, 
Seta & Donaldson, 1992). It consists of four target symbols [! # ""and (] embedded 
within other typewriter symbols [e.g., @ % * ? $]. The goal of the task is to count the 
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number of times these four target symbols appear in each row, as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. A score on this task consists of the total number of target symbols 
accurately identified within a specified but unannounced time frame (3 minutes). 
The tasks were collected and handed to an assistant to score while subjects waited. 
Actually, the experimenter and the assistant were organizing pre-determined feedback 
sheets to hand back. After a short delay, the experimenter re-entered with the test 
results. In addition to a written instruction sheet, each subject received the Task Result 
Sheet (marked with their social security number) indicating how their group performed. 
The written instructions for the important condition stated "enclosed is the result of how 
you and your group performed on the BART" or "on the task" for the unimportant 
condition. 
The evaluation manipulation involved a combination of performance feedback and 
social comparison information. Participants given success feedback read that their group's 
average score (including their own) was in the 80th percentile which means that "your 
group did better than 80% of the people who have taken this task". Failure feedback 
stated their group's average score including their own score was in the 30th percentile 
which means that "70% of the people who have taken this task did better than your 
group". In addition, participants read that an average score on the task was in the 57th 
percentile and a UNC-G's student average score was in the 63rd percentile. Further 
interpretation of the scores was guided by the following key: 
PERCENTILES 
0-30 Below average. On the average this group is lacking in the ability 
to identify quickly and accurately abstract symbols. This 
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inadequate abstract reasoning ability may be indicative of cognitive 
and intellectual deficits among the group members. 
40-70 Average. On the average, this group has reasonable ability in 
identifying quickly and accurately abstract symbols. This indicates 
adequate intellectual and abstract reasoning ability. 
80-100 Above average. On the average, this group is intelligent and 
conceptual. This indicates superior ability in abstract reasoning 
and intellectual situations. 
Dependent Measures: Included with the task results were additional 
measures participants were asked to fill out. Subjects rated on a 7 point scale how 
characteristic a list of eight positive and eight negative traits were of themselves, their 
group, the other group, and persons who obtained above- or below-average scores on the 
task. Each target group was rated on separate sheets. The order of rating their own 
group or the other group was counterbalanced throughout. The evaluation was 
determined by subtracting the total negative trait values from the total positive trait 
values. If a value for a particular trait was missing, the average value corresponding to 
that individual's rating of similarly evaluative traits was entered into the composite score. 
Thus, a composite score for each group could range from + 48 to -48. 
Participants were further asked to assess their reaction to the score obtained by 
their group. Written instructions reminded them of their group's performance (including 
their own) and the importance (or unimportance) of the meaning of the score. Thus, 
subjects in the important condition were told this task has been shown to indicate 
superior ability or deficits in abstract reasoning and intellectual situations. Participants 
in the unimportant condition were reminded that this task has not been shown to indicate 
superior ability or deficits in abstract reasoning and intellectual situations. 
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The scale used to assess their reaction consisted of 24 adjectives from the 
Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist. Embedded within the 24 adjectives were the same 
10 adjectives previously used to assess a baseline level of anxiety and hostility. Two lists 
(A or B) containing the 10 adjectives and 14 neutral adjectives were used. If participants 
received list A upon entering the experiment, they were given list B to assess their 
reaction to the manipulation. Participants were also asked to assess a) how satisfied they 
were with their group's performance, b) the percentile of their own probable 
performance, c) how important it was to them for their group to do well, d) how 
important it was to them personally to do well, and d) the validity of the task for 
assessing overall intelligence. As a manipulation check, they were also asked if their 
group's score was lower than that of the average UNC-G score. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESULTS 
Reliability of Stability and Level of Self-Esteem Scores 
Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scores and stability scores were assessed during 
mass screening (Time 1) as a means of identifying potential participants. These scales 
were re-administered at the time of the experiment (Time 2) in order to insure that the 
classification of participants had not changed. For Time 1 and Time 2, level of self-
esteem scores correlated at r=.75, and stability self-esteem scores correlated at r=.53. 
Since both stability and level of esteem scores did not change significantly over time, 
scores that originally identified participants were used as the measure for further analyses. 
Manipulation Checks 
To assess the effect of the manipulation for feedback participants were asked to 
indicate their response to several questions using a 7 point scale, where 1 indicated not 
at all and 7 indicated very much. 
An analysis of variance (ANOV A) performed on the satisfaction of their group's 
performance revealed a significant main effect of feedback, F(1,162)=454.21, p<.OOOl. 
Participants told that their group had failed were significantly less satisfied with their 
group's performance {M=2.34) than participants who were told their group succeeded 
{M=6.34). Similarly, the majority of participants in the success feedback condition 
disagreed that their group's score was lower than the average UNC-G student (75 true 
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and 5 false) whereas participants in the failure feedback condition agreed with this 
statement (98 true and 2 false). Thus, the feedback manipulation was successful. 
When given feedback information about the performance of the individual's 
group, individuals were told that the group's average score included their own score. 
Participant's were not, however, given information about their own personal performance 
or the performance of the other group. The experimenter asked participants what 
percentile they believed their own personal score may have been. Participants in the 
group success feedback condition believed they had also individually performed above-
average (own-score M=77.21 percentile) whereas those in the group failure feedback 
condition believed they had also individually performed below-average (own-score 
M=49.14 percentile), F(l,l63)= 132.21, p<.OOOl. Furthermore, in the failure condition, 
high self-esteem individuals believed that their own performance was closer to the 
average score of 57% than low self-esteem individuals (HSE M=53.44 and I..SE 
M=43.98, respectively), F(1,163)=5.16, p<.03. This supports the results of several 
studies (see Baumeister, 1993a for a review) which contend that low self-esteem 
individuals feel less competent than high self-esteem individuals. 
Direct Measures of Self-Serving Strategies: 
Evaluations of Task Importance and Task Accuracy 
One strategy of protecting or enhancing one's self view would be to dismiss the 
importance of doing well on the task when one fails and bolster the importance of doing 
well when one succeeds. Another strategy would be to dismiss (or bolster) the credibility 
of the validity ascribed to the a~sessment of that task after failure (or success) feedback. 
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The employment of these strategies should be further affected by whether an individual's 
self-esteem is high or low, stable or unstable. 
Participants were asked how important it was to them 'to have personally done 
well' on the task (importance of personal performance), and for 'their group to have done 
well' on the task (importance of group performance). An analysis of variance on the 
importance of personal performance measure revealed a significant self-esteem x 
feedback x task importance interaction, F{l,164)=4.84, p<.03. As can be seen in Table 
2, when the task was unimportant, low self-esteem individuals dismissed the importance 
of personally performing well on the task when they failed {M=4.09) and bolstered the 
importance of personally performing well when they succeeded {M=5.04), F(1,164)=3.98, 
p<.OS, but not when the task was important {F=5.04, S=5.20). High self-esteem 
individuals, on the other hand, did not significantly alter the importance of personally 
performing well as a function of success or failure feedback when the task was 
unimportant (F=S.ll, S=5.35, F<l). However, when the task was important, high self-
esteem individuals had a tendency to dismiss the importance of doing well (F=4.93, 
S=5.76, F(1,164)=3.04, p<.08). These results indicate that both high and low self-
esteem individuals are capable of engaging in self-serving strategies but the employment 
of these strategies depends on how relevant the evaluative feedback is to their self view. 
High self-esteem participants engage in self-serving strategies when the task is highly 
relevant to their self view. Performance on a relatively unimportant task is less relevant 
to a positive self view, therefore, requires no self-serving response. For low self-esteem 
participants, performance on an unimportant task allows for the individual to engage in 
self-serving biases. When the task is important, however, they seem unable to do so. 
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A second Anova was performed on the importance of the group's performance 
measure. This analysis revealed a significant self-esteem stability x level of self-esteem 
x feedback x task importance interaction, F(1,164)=5.73, p<.02, indicating that the 
ratings of the importance of the group performing well enhanced the sensitivity of both 
high and low self-esteem participants to the evaluative feedback, but in an opposite 
pattern. As indicated by Table 3, unstable high self-esteem participants dismissed the 
importance of the group's performance when failing an important task (F=3.36) and 
bolstered the importance of the group's performance when succeeding on an important 
task (S=5.17), F(l,164)= 6.75, p<.Ol. When the task was unimportant, there was no 
significant difference between the ratings of the group's performance due to feedback 
(F=4.5, S=4.29, ns). Unstable low self-esteem individuals displayed the same pattern of 
dismissing and bolstering the importance of the group doing well (F=2.92, S=4.92) due 
to feedback but only when the task was unimportant, F(l,l64)=8.23, p<.Ol. When the 
task was important, unstable low self-esteem did not differ their ratings of the importance 
of the group doing well because of feedback (F=4.13, S=4.0, ns). Stable self-esteem 
participants, whether high or low, did not engage in either strategy of dismissing or 
bolstering the importance of their group performing well, regardless of the importance 
of the task or feedback about one's performance. Thus, if one is secure about their self 
view, whether positive or negative, self-serving mechanisms are not employed. 
A similar pattern of results also emerged on the assessment of task accuracy 
measure, as can be seen from Table 4. The analysis of variance revealed a significant 
stability of self-esteem x level of self-esteem x feedback x task importance interaction, 
F(1,164)=3.89, p<.05. Unstable high self-esteem participants indicated that the task was 
f 
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less accurate at assessing intelligence when they failed an important task (F=1.91) and 
bolstered the accuracy of the assessment when they succeeded on an important task 
(S=3.17), F(1,164)=4.31, p<.05. When the task was unimportant, however, there was 
no difference in the assessment of task accuracy due to feedback (F=2.17, S= 1.86, ns). 
Unstable low self-esteem individuals displayed the same pattern of dismissing and 
bolstering the accuracy of the task's assessment of intelligence (F= 1.58, S=3.33) but only 
when the task was unimportant, F(1,164)=8.33, p<.Ol. When the task was important, 
unstable low self-esteem participants' ratings of the task's accuracy did not differ across 
feedback condition (F=2.13, S=2.67, ns). On the other hand, stable high self-esteem 
participants did not engage in either strategy of dismissing or bolstering the accuracy of 
the task's assessment, regardless of the importance of the task or feedback about one's 
performance. Stable low self-esteem participants, however, rated the accuracy of the task 
lower when they failed and oolstered the rating of accuracy when they succeeded, 
regardless of the whether the task was important or unimportant. 
This pattern of data is particularly illuminating in light of the inconsistent patterns 
of data which have suggested that low self-esteem individuals are constrained in their 
ability to engage in self-enhancing strategies (Brown et al., 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988; 
Crocker et al., 1987; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Kernis et al, 1993). If it is true that low 
self-esteem individuals are not capable then, whether the task is important or 
unimportant, you should find that low self-esteem individuals do not distort the 
importance or accuracy of the task. This was not the case in the present study. 
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Indirect Measures of Self-Serving Strategies: 
Affect and Intergroup Bias 
Affect 
Univariate tests of initial baseline measures of anxiety and hostility revealed 
significant differences associated with stability and level of personal self-esteem. 
Anxiety: A significant main . effect for stability indicated unstable self-esteem was 
associated with higher baseline levels of anxiety (M=13.21) than stable self-esteem 
(M=9.17), F(l,l30)=10.51, p<.002. Interestingly and counter to expectations, anxiety 
levels were not affected by one's level of esteem (F<l). That is, low self-esteem 
individuals did not exhibit significantly higher baseline levels of anxiety than high self-
esteem individuals (l.SE=12.45 and HSE=10.76, p<.21). 
Hostility: A similar pattern emerged for hostility. There was a significant main effect for 
stability of self-esteem, with unstable self-esteem participants (M=11.55) displaying 
significantly higher baseline levels of hostility than stable self-esteem participants 
(M=9.93), F(l,l30)=3.9:9.;-p<.05. The same results were apparent for level of self-
esteem, with low self-esteem (M=l1.70) being associated with higher levels of hostility 
than high self-esteem (M=9.73), F(l,l30)=6.54, p<.02. Thus, hostility is related to 
stability and level of self-esteem, with unstable self-esteem and low self-esteem 
participants displaying higher levels of hostility than stable and high self-esteem 
participants. 
That the amount of anxiety and hostility one experiences is related to stability and 
level of self-esteem in the absence of direct evaluative self-relevant information is an 
interesting finding. Kernis (1993), has not demonstrated that level of self-esteem was 
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related to a propensity to experience hostility in situations in which individuals were given 
self-relevant information. In addition, Kemis et al. (1989) established correlational 
evidence that hostility proness (as indicated by elevations on Buss-Durkee Hostility 
Inventory) is a function of the moderating effect of stability on level of self-esteem. 
Although stability and level of self-esteem had main effects on one's level of hostility, 
these present results do not support the interactive effect found by Kemis et al. (1989). 
In regards to anxiety, this present study also did not find that a low self view was 
associated with higher levels of anxiety than a positive self view. The combination of 
these findings supports the contentions of Watson & Clark (1984) that heightened levels 
of reactivity due to the effect of stability and/or level of self-esteem when given evaluative 
self-relevant information could be due to a dispositional tendency in negative affect. 
Post-Manipulation Levels of Anxiety and Hostility 
Significant main effects were found on post-manipulation measures of anxiety and 
hostility. Overall, the experimental situation significantly reduced overall feelings of 
anxiety (Anx1=11.30 vs Anx2=9.36), F(l,l30)=33.45, p<.OOOl while significantly 
increasing feelings of hostility (Hostl=10.66vs Host2=12.19) F(l,l30)=15.91, p<.OOOl. 
Because of the significant differences in baseline measures of anxiety and hostility, further 
analyses were performed using. baseline measures of anxiety and hostility as covariates. 
Thus, all further means (M) discussed are adjusted means. 
Post-Manipulation Levels of Anxiety 
The analysis of covariance on self-esteem revealed a significant main effect, 
F(l,l29)=4.23, p<.OS. This analysis revealed that, low self-esteem individuals exhibited 
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significantly higher levels of anxiety (M=9.91) than high self-esteem individuals 
(M=8.68). There was no main effect due to the stability of self-esteem. The marginally 
significant esteem x stability interaction further indicated that instability moderates the 
anxiety levels of high and low self-esteem participants, F(l,l29)=3.46, p<.07. This 
interaction is due to the fact that unstable low self-esteem individuals tended to have 
significantly higher levels of anxiety than stable low self-esteem individuals (unstable 
l.SE=l0.29, stable l.SE=9.54); whereas an opposite pattern emerged for high self-esteem 
individuals (unstable HSE=7.94, stable HSE=9.42). Although neither of these 
comparisons are significant, the effects were in the opposite direction and contributed to 
the esteem x stability interaction. 
The effect of feedback on post-manipulation measures of anxiety also showed a 
weak but expected trend (failur~=9.81, success=8.79), F(l,l29)=2.93, p<.09). Although 
it is reasonable to expect that neg&tive self-relevant information would have increased 
anxiety, this effect was weak. One possible explanation may be that anxiety was reduced 
as a result of the process of rating the target groups. Another explanation may be that 
the reduction in anxiety is indicative of an overall lowering of experimental anxiety. 
Manipulating task importance produced a significant interaction between self-
esteem and task importance, F(1,129)=4.50, p<.04. Whether individuals were told the 
task was important or unimportant did not significantly affect the level of anxiety 
expressed by low self-esteem participants (lmportant=9.57, Unimportant=l0.26, ns). 
However, for high self-esteem participants, an important task was associated with a higher 
level of anxiety than was ~he case for an unimportant task (Important=9.61, 
Unimportant=7.75). Furthermore, when the task was unimportant, low self-esteem 
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individuals expressed higher levels of anxiety than high self-esteem individuals 
(HSE=7.75, l.SE=10.26). It could be that the unimportance of the task in this 
experimental situation created ambiguity for low self-esteem participants thereby 
increasing their level~ of anxiety. 
Post-Manipulation Levels of Hostility 
Different from anxiety, evaluative feedback was demonstrated to have a 
significant effect on one's level of hostility, F(1,129)=22.05, p<.0001. Negative self-
relevant information significantly increased levels of hostility (M=14.18) whereas positive 
self-relevant information did not (M=10.47). Since one's self view was bolstered and not 
threatened, it is not surprising that success feedback did not produce increased feelings 
of hostility. 
There was a marginally significant interaction between feedback and level of self-
esteem, F(l,129)=3.11,p<.08. Planned comparisons revealed that feedback, whether 
threatening or bolstering, affected the hostility level of high self-esteem individuals to a 
greater extent (F=15.00, S=9.91) than low self-esteem individuals (F=13.35, 8=11.04), 
F(1,129)=7.50, p<.Ol. 
Affective reactions to evaluative feedback has also been investigated by others 
(Swann et al.,1987; Kernis et al., 1993). Swann et al (1987) found that participants 
receiving negative feedback were more anxious and hostile than those receiving positive 
feedback. These affective reactions were unaffected by the positivity or negativity of 
their self view and were concluded to be weak support for self-enhancement strategies. 
Kernis et al. (1993) also measured affective reactions to evaluative feedback by summing 
the responses to the individual positive and negative words; measures of hostility and 
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anxiety were not subcategorized. Kernis et al. (1993) found that individuals receiving 
positive feedback had more positive emotions and less negative emotion than those 
receiving negative feedback. Furthermore, uns~able high self-esteem individuals indicated 
no affective reaction (positive or negative) following negative feedback but indicated 
greater positive affect following positive feedback. Instability was unrelated to measures 
of affect in low self-esteem individuals. 
Our results support the conclusion that a threat toward one's self view 
significantly increases one's feelings of hostility and bolstering one's self view reduces 
overall affect. As would be expected, low self-esteem is related to significantly higher 
levels of anxiety than high self-esteem. Stability, however, was unrelated to post-
manipulation levels of affect. These post-manipulation measures of affect are opposite 
to the baseline measures where higher anxiety levels were indicated by stability of self-
esteem but not by level of self-esteem. Interestingly, although initial levels of anxiety 
were held constant, significant differences of anxiety due to level of self-esteem still 
emerged. This indicates that level of self-esteem is responsive to external situational cues 
whereas stability seems unaffected. High self-esteem individuals were more responsive 
to evaluative feedback as indicated by the high level of hostility when their positive view 
is threatened and the lower level of hostility when that self view is bolstered. 
Intergroup Bias Effect 
Participants in this study belonged to two different types of groups. The first 
group was the minimal, or randomly assigned group. The second type of group consisted 
of being a member of a conceptually similar group. That is, if you and your group failed 
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on the task then you would also be a member of a group of below-average scorers. 
Likewise, if you and your group succeeded, your conceptually similar group would be 
above-average scorers. 
To analyze the intergroup bias effect for the minimal group, ratings of Group A 
and Group B were coded as to whether Group A was a participant's own group (ingroup) 
or the other group ( outgroup ). Ratings of above- and below-average scorers were also 
coded as to whether the individual received success or failure feedback. Thus, when the 
participant's group received success feedback, the above-average group was the 
conceptual ingroup; and the below-average group the conceptual outgroup. The reverse 
would be true in the failure feedback condition, with the below-average group becoming 
the ingroup and the above-average group the outgroup. Ratings of ingroup-outgroup 
members (in the minimal and conceptual situation) were analyzed with a repeated 
measures ANOV A, with stability, self-esteem, evaluative feedback, and task importance 
as between-subjects factors and target of rating variables (ingroup/outgroup) as a within-
subjects factor. 
Intergroup Bias Effect within the Minimal Group 
In the minimal intergroup situation, participants did not show favoritism towards 
the ingroup (M=18.30) over the outgroup (M=18.35). That is, merely being a member 
of this randomly assigned group did not motivate a desire to positively evaluate the 
ingroup relative to the outgroup. This finding does not replicate the ingroup bias effect 
which has previously been demonstrated in the minimal intergroup paradigm (Brewer, 
1979; Crocker et al., 1987; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Diehl, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Turner, 1981; Seta & Seta, 1992, and in press). 
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In summarizing the findings of the effect of feedback on ingroup-outgroup 
distinctions, Brewer (1979) found that individuals maximize favorable comparisons and 
minimize unfavorable comparisons between groups. Therefore, when one's group fails, 
the difference in ingroup-outgroup ratings is minimized and the difference is maximized 
when one's group succeeds. In this study, feedback about the performance of one's own 
group affected the evaluation of both the ingroup and the outgroup resulting in an 
interaction between feedback and target of evaluation, F(l,l63)=12.19, p<.0006, as 
demonstrated in Table 5. Although both target groups were rated unfavorably under 
conditions of failure, planned comparisons revealed that participants rated their own 
failing group significantly more negatively (M=14.32) than the outgroup (M=16.78), 
F(l,l63)=6.90, p<.Ol. When one's own group succeeded, the succeeding ingroup is rated 
in a more significantly positive way (M=23.34) than the outgroup (M=20.34), 
F(l,163)=9.17, p<.OOS. Although individuals maximized the differences between groups 
under success conditions, they did not minimize differences under failure conditions. In 
fact, under failure conditions; the outgroup is rated in a significantly more positive 
manner than the ingroup. Therefore, although an intergroup bias effect due to self-
relevant feedback was demonstrated, the bias did not result in ingroup favoritism. 
It should be stressed that, in the present study, feedback about the other group's 
performance outcome was not given, therefore, we do not know for certain what 
inference participants made concerning the performance of the other group. However, 
as indicated by the significant main effect of feedback on the evaluation of the outgroup, 
failure feedback about one's own group performance yielded lower ratings of the 
outgroup (M = 16.78) than was obtained with success feedback (M=20.34), F(1,163)=5.96, 
i 
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p<.02. This suggests that ingroup feedback does affect the evaluation of the outgroup 
even without the context of direct comparative information. This effect is not a 
generalization of negative or positive affect towards others. If it was merely a 
generalization of affect, then significant differences between ratings of the groups due to 
feedback would not have occurred. 
Although feedback failed to produce the expected ingroup bias effect, favoritism 
for one's own group relative to the outgroup was found to be affected by level of self-
esteem, as indicated by the significant self-esteem x target of evaluation interaction, 
F(1,163)= 5.75, p<.02. As can be seen in Table 6, this interaction is due to the fact that, 
regardless of evaluative feedback, low self-esteem individuals tended to rate the outgroup 
more negatively (M=16.57) than their own ingroup (M=18.25), F (1,163)=3.16, p<.OS 
whereas an opposite pattern emerged for high self-esteem participants. High self-esteem 
participants tended to rate the ingroup more negatively (M=18.34) than the outgroup 
(M=19.90). Although neither one of these comparisons were significant, the effects were 
in the opposite direction and the interaction involving those measures was significant. In 
addition, low self-esteem participants rated the outgroup more negatively (M= 16~57) than 
high self-esteem participants (M=19.90), F(1,163)=5.07, p<.05; whereas high and low 
self-esteem persons did not .differ on their ratings of the ingroup (HSE=18.34, 
I.SE=18.25, ns). This finding supports Wills' (1981) contention that low self-esteem 
individuals have a greater need to enhance their self-esteem, and therefore a greater 
need to engage in intergroup bias. In the situation where no direct comparative 
! information is available, this enhancement tendency cari be obtained by derogating the outgroup in order to create a more favorable social comparison for one's own group. 
~~ 
~ 
~ 
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Although this was the case for low self-esteem participants, it was not the case for high 
self-esteem individuals in this study. 
That the intergroup bias effect was found with low self-esteem individuals but not 
high self-esteem individuals is interesting but these data should be interpreted with 
caution for several reasons. These data are counter to the literature on intergroup bias 
effects (Crocker et al., 1987; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Seta & Seta, 1992, and in press) 
which found evidence of high self-esteem participants displaying intergroup bias but not 
low self-esteem participants. In this study it is very possible that high and low self-esteem 
individuals made very different inferences about the performance of the outgroup since 
feedback about the outgroup's performance was not given. In the Seta & Seta papers 
(1992, and in press) when pa.rticipants were given explicit feedback about both the 
ingroup and the outgroup, it was high rather than low self-esteem participants who 
demonstrated the most pronounced intergroup bias effect. Consistent with the results 
of Seta & Seta, Crocker also found that high self-esteem participants were more likely 
to engage in intergroup bias than low self-esteem participants. Counter to the work of 
Seta & Seta, however, Crocker did not give participants feedback about the outgroup's 
performance. Therefore, her methodology is somewhat similar to those employed in this 
current study. However, there is a major difference between Crocker's procedure and 
the procedure in this study. In the present study, participants were selected and knew 
they were selected specifically because of personality factors. Therefore, in this study, low 
self-esteem participants may nave thought that regardless of the group they were in, 
others in the room were likely to have also failed. Conversely, high self-esteem subjects 
may have thought others in the room were like them and succeeded on the task 
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regardless of their group's performance. If high and low self-esteem subjects indeed 
made these inferences, than the strength of the intergroup bias would be stronger for low 
self-esteem than high self-esteem individuals, as was the case in this study. 
Intergroup Bias Effect within the Conceptual Group 
As expected, ratings of the conceptual group were conceptually similar to those 
in the minimal group. Analysis of the ratings revealed a significant main effect for target 
indicating that above-average scorers were rated more positively (M=23.13) than below-
average scorers (M=8.82), F(1,164)=152.44, p<.OOOl. 
An intergroup bias effect was also revealed by a significant target x feedback 
interaction, F(l,l64)=28.01, p<.OOOl. An indication of ingroup favoritism on this 
measure would be a maximization of differences between above- and below-average 
scorers under success feedback conditions and a minimization of differences between 
above- and below-average scorers under failure conditions. Participants receiving success 
feedback rated above-average scorers (M=26.23) more positively and below-average 
scorers (M=4.67) more negatively than participants receiving failure feedback (M=20.65 
vs M=12.14, respectively). See Table 7. 
The marginally significant target x feedback x self-esteem interaction further 
indicated that the tendency to engage in intergroup bias was stronger for low than for 
high self-esteem participants, F(l,l64)=3.05, p<.08. Of interest in this study, is 
comparing how low self-esteem individuals engage in social comparisons relative to high 
self-esteem individuals. It may be that both show ingroup favoritism but one does this to 
a greater extent than the other. One way to look at this would be to compare at the 
evaluative spread within conditions. That is, compare the difference between how low 
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self-esteem participants evaluate the ingroup and outgroup relative to the evaluations of 
the same groups by high self-esteem participants. Planned comparisons of the evaluative 
spread confirmed that there was a greater intergroup bias effect for low self-esteem than 
high self-esteem participants. Low self-esteem participants maximized the difference in 
the rating of their own ingroup relative to the outgroup when the comparison was 
favorable (evaluative spread in success condition=24.93) and minimized the difference 
in ratings when the comparison was unfavorable (evaluative spread in failure 
condition= 18.3 7). This difference between evaluative spreads was significant 
F(l,164)=7.79, p<.Ol. See Table 8. 
There were no further significant effects on intergroup bias for the minimal or 
conceptual groups. An intergroup bias effect due to the interactive effect of group 
evaluations, self-esteem and group feedback is typically found in this type of research. 
The fact that such an effect was not obtained in this study could be due to the lack of 
COII'.parative information about the other group's performance and the apparent lack of 
reactivity to negative self-relevant information. 
Sclf-&teem Reactivity and Evaluative Feedback 
Of particular interest in this study was whether individuals receiving evaluative 
group feedback would react with the same intensity as Kernis' participants who received 
individual feedback. That is, would the discrepancy in the ratings of groups be due to the 
stability and level of one's self-esteem when presented with evaluative self-relevant 
information. 
The analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of feedback within the 
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minimal group situation demonstrating support for the successful manipulation of group 
feedback. When given failure feedback about one,s own group performance, participants 
were significantly more negative towards both target groups (M=15.54) than when told 
their group succeeded (M=21.82), F(1,163)=17.91, p<.OOOl. There was no main effect 
of feedback on the ratings of the conceptual group, indicating feedback did not distort 
the ratings or above- or below-average individuals. 
The significant interaction between feedback and self-esteem for both the minimal 
and conceptual groups indicated that reactions to success and failure feedback depends 
on one,s level of self-esteem, F(l,l63)=12.25, p<.OOl, and F(1,164)=14.45, p<.OOl, 
respectively (see Table 9). Across both group situations, success feedback created more 
reactivity in the ratings of the ingroups and outgroups by high and low self-esteem 
individuals,(HSE=24.97,LSE=18.46own-other;HSE=19.92,LSE=10.74,above-below); 
whereas failure feedback produced no significant difference in ratings (HSE= 16.34, 
LSE=16.47 own-other; HSE=15.76, LSE=16.52 above-below). In both group situations, 
self-esteem was relatively unaffected by negative self-relevant information in that a threat 
to one,s self did not give rise to self-enhancing strategies by either high or low self-
esteem. When given positive self-relevant information, high self-esteem individuals were 
more positive in the ratings of the groups but not so with low self-esteem individuals. In 
the minimal group situation, F(l,l63)=8.69, p<.Ol, high self-esteem participants were 
also more reactive in their responses to evaluative feedback as indicated by the greater 
discrepancy in their evaluations, (F=14.76, 8=24.97, evaluative spread=l0.91) than low 
self-esteem participants (F=16.52, S=18.46, evaluative spread=1.94). This was not found 
within the conceptual group situation, (F < 1 ). This may be because the size of the 
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conceptual group of above- below-average scorers is much larger than that of the minimal 
group. This reasoning is consistent with the findings of Gerard & Hoyt (1974). They 
found that ingroup favoritism decreases as size of the group increases. 
This same intense reaction by high self-esteem individuals as a result of evaluative 
feedback exists not only in the rating of the ingroup but also in the rating of the 
outgroup, as demonstrated by the significant main effects for own, F(1,163)=10.27, 
p<.~02, other, F(1,163)=9.72, p<.003, above, F(1,164)=4.54, p<.04, and below 
F(1,164)=11.78, p<.OOl. 
Stability had no independent effect on the discrepancy of the rating of the 
ingroup or the outgroup. However, as with self-esteem, a similar pattern of reactivity 
emerged in the minimal group situation. As can be seen in Table 10, the significant 
interaction between stability of self-esteem and feedback in the minimal group situation 
indicated that unstable self-esteem participants were more reactive to evaluative feedback 
in their ratings of both target groups than stable self-esteem participants, F(1,163)=7.23, 
p<.Ol. That is, evaluative feedback produced a significantly greater discrepancy in the 
ratings by unstable self-esteem participants (F=l3.71, S=22.54, evaluative spread 8.83) 
than stable self-esteem participants (F= 17.39, 5=21.23, evaluative spread 3.84). 
Although stability and self-esteem separately interacted with feedback to produce 
discrepancies in levels of reactivity, the combined interactive effect between stability, self-
esteem and feedback did not reach statistical significance. However, planned comparisons 
of the evaluative spreads for the stability x esteem x feedback interaction were performed 
on the ratings of own/other and above-/below-average scorers to establish whether, as 
predicted by Kernis, unstable high self-esteem individuals are more reactive to evaluative 
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feedback than stable high self-esteem or low self-esteem. One way to look at this would 
be to compare the discrepancy in ratings of groups by unstable high self-esteem 
participants to all others. Because evaluative feedback about one's own group's 
performance should produce similar reactions to that of feedback regarding personal 
performance, the interaction for the evaluation of the ingroup was used for the 
comparisons. In the minimal group situation, the evaluative spread for unstable high self-
esteem individuals (18.1) was significantly greater than the evaluative spread for stable 
high self-esteem individuals (9.94), F(1,163)=6.15, p<.OS, (see Table 11). Since the 
evaluative spread for high self-esteem ·participants was the closest score to unstable self-
esteem participants, it follows that the remaining spreads were also significantly lower 
(stable low self-esteem=-.91, unstable low self-esteem=-7.62) (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 
1978). The same held true within the conceptual group situation, with unstable high self-
esteem being indicative of larger discrepancies in reactivity (22.23) than stable high self-
esteem (12.98), F(1,164)=5.896, p<.OS, or all others (stable LSE=10.26, unstable 
LSE= 10.32). This reactivity data lends support to Kernis' contention that unstable high 
self-esteem individuals are the most reactive to evaluative feedback. It goes beyond 
Kernis' previous findings in that the reactivity of unstable high self-esteem individuals is 
affected not only by personal evaluative feedback, but is also affected by evaluative 
feedback about one's group performance. 
Self Ratings 
The univariate tests of participants' self ratings revealed only a main effect for 
self-esteem, F(1,164)=14.32, P<.0002, such that high self-esteem participants rated 
themselves more positively (M=29.48) than did low self-esteem participants (M=24.74). 
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Unlike previous studies, in this study both the positive and negative self-relevant 
information did not have an effect on one's self ratings {F<l, ns). There was a 
marginally significant interaction between self-esteem and task importance, 
F{l,l64)=2.97, P<.09. Planned comparison of the means revealed that high self-esteem 
participants evaluated themselves more positively than low self-esteem participants when 
told the task was not relevant to their overall intelligence (HSE M=30.35, I.SE 
M=23.83), F(1,164)=13.42, P<.OOOl. 
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CHAPTER4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results of this study provide evidence that both self-consistency and self-
enhancement theories are important in understanding the engagement of self-serving 
strategies. While prior research has provided stronger support for low self esteem 
individuals being unable or incapable of engaging in self-enhancing strategies, these 
present findings suggest that both high and low self-esteem individuals are capable but 
it depends on a combination of factors including the self-relevance of the feedback, the 
stability of one's self-view and the type of measure used to indicate the employment of 
self-serving strategies. 
First, the engagement of self-serving strategies depends on the relevance of the 
evaluative feedback to one's self concept. Highly self-relevant, negative feedback 
(although threatening) is consistent with one's low self view and constrains low self-
esteem individuals from engaging in self-enhancement processes. They are faced with the 
situation of dealing with consistent but highly threatening information. Thus, although 
motivated to maintain a positive self view, they are constrained by the fact that this 
information cannot be distorted as it is consistent and very important to one's self view. 
Highly self-relevant, negative information for high self-esteem individuals may be as 
equally threatening. However, they are not constrained by the reality of the information 
as it is inconsistent with a positive self view. Thus, high self-esteem individuals, also being 
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motivated to maintain a positive self view, are not constrained from distorting the 
inconsistent information. On the surface, this scenario would lend support for the 
contention that low self-esteem individuals are incapable of engaging in self-enhancement 
processes. However, if the constraints of reality are altered by manipulating the 
relevance of the task feedback to one's self concept, then low self-esteem individuals are 
capable of engaging in self-enhancement strategies as demonstrated by the present 
results. Previous research investigating the relationship of self-serving strategies and self-
esteem typically employed a highly self-relevant task. If prior research had employed 
feedback that was not highly self-relevant, then the prior results could have concluded 
that only low self-esteem individuals were capable of engaging in these strategies. 
A second factor in understanding the employment of self-serving strategies by 
high and low self-esteem individuals is the stability of one's self view, as suggested by 
Kernis (1993). Stable high self-esteem individuals do not engage in self-serving strategies 
in either the important or unimportant condition because their secure positive view is not 
affected by this type of feedback. For unstable high self-esteem individuals, evaluative 
feedback seems to have more of an effect than for stable high self-esteem individuals but 
only when the feedback implicates one's intellectual and creative ability. It is also the 
case, on some of these measures, that unstable low self-esteem individuals may also be 
more threatened with negative self-relevant information than stable low self-esteem. This 
is interesting because these data suggest that the ability to engage in self-enhancing biases 
depends upon the stability of one's self view as well as the self-relevance of the evaluative 
feedback. 
The intergroup bias results (an indirect measure of self-enhancement) are 
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inconsistent with previous research findings that individuals with high self-esteem display 
greater intergroup bias than low self-esteem. In this study, low self-esteem individuals 
maximized the difference in the rating of groups under success conditions and minimized 
the difference under failure conditions in both the minimal and meaningful group 
situation. When one's low self view has been bolstered, the direction of the bias comes 
from enhancing one's own group when experiencing success. There was no difference in 
the rating of the outgroup due to feedback. Overall, stability was not found to have an 
interactive effect with self-esteem and feedback in producing intergroup bias. The reason 
for the weak results could be due to the lack of comparison information about the 
outgroup's performance. Altho.ugh stability was not found to have interactive effects with 
self-esteem and feedback in producing intergroup bias, stability was shown to moderate 
responses to feedback for high self-esteem individuals. Unstable high self-esteem 
individuals were the most reactive to evaluative feedback as indicated by the greater 
evaluative spread of the ingroup in both the minimal and conceptual group situation. 
This finding lends support for the conclusion that stability is associated with enhanced 
sensitivity to evaluative events, even in the intergroup situation. 
li 
CHAPTERS 
IMPUCATIONS 
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In a review of the literature on individual expectancies about competence and 
reactions to evaluative feedback, Shrauger (1975) raised the issue that it was unclear 
whether low self-esteem individuals were affected more by negative information because 
it was consistent with their self view therefore easily accepted, or whether negative 
information was more stressful and they have less "adequate techniques for dealing with 
all types of stressful situations" (pg 592). The mechanism, according to Shrauger, 
accounting for this discrepancy had not been explained. Evidence for a mechanism 
which would account for the apparent discrepancy in behavior by low self-esteem 
individuals was also not answered by this present study. One could speculate, however, 
that since threats to the self view increases anxiety, those individuals already experiencing 
a high level of arousal from a low self view would find threatening information highly 
anxiety provoking. An even greater increase in anxiety should be produced when the 
task is important than when the task is unimportant. Increases in anxiety and frustration 
have been demonstrated to reduce overall cognitive capacity and interfere with 
performance (see Seta Seta & Donaldson, 1991 for review). Therefore, under conditions 
of negative self-relevant information, it is possible that when the task is important, low 
self-esteem individuals are incapable of self-enhancing strategies due to cognitive capacity 
constraints. When the task is unimportant, low self-esteem individuals should be capable 
as there is less anxiety producing constraints on cognitive capacity, and they are motivated 
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by the threatening self-relevant information. 
In a review of the issues regarding self-serving strategies due to self-esteem and 
evaluative feedback, Blaine & Crocker (1993) suggest that we need not "assume a 
motive" for self-serving strategies. From an information processing model, consistent 
information is better believed by individuals than inconsistent information. This view 
suggests a distinction or independence between cognitive and affective or motivational 
reactions. This present study does not attempt to pit a motivational interpretation against 
a cognitive interpretation. Rather, it offers an explanation of when both cognitive and 
motivational processes can be involved in the engagement of self-serving strategies ( eg. 
Brown et al., 1988). More importantly, the present results imply that the unity 
assumption (held by both self-consistency and self-enhancement theorists) that "a 
superordinate cognitive system oversees all mental activity and resolves inconsistencies 
between thoughts, feelings, and actions" (pg 886) should not be dropped as suggested by 
Swann et al. (1987). 
In conclusion, these findings help contribute to our understanding of the factors 
that affect the self-esteem hypothesis in intergroup behavior. Furthermore, they suggest 
that the ability to engage in self-serving strategies depends upon the stability of one's self 
view as well as the self-relevance of the evaluative feedback. 
46 
BffiUOGRAPHY 
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M.A. (1988). Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem 
and intergroup discrimination. European Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 317-334. 
Baumeister, R.F. (1993a), Self Esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard. Plenum Press: New 
York. 
Baumeister, R.F. (1993b). Understanding the inner nature of low self-esteem: 
Uncertain, fragile, protective, and conflicted. In R.F. Baumeister (Ed.). Self Esteem: 
The puzzle of low self-regard. Plenum Press: New York. 
Baumeister, R.F., Heatherton, T.F., & Tice, D.M. (1993). When ego threats lead to self 
regulation failure: Negative consequences of high self-esteem. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 64, 141-156. 
Baumgardner, A.H. (1990). To know oneself is to like oneself: Self-certainty and self 
affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1062-1072. 
Becker, J. (1979). Vulnerable self-esteem as a predisposing factor in depressive disorders. 
In R.A. Depue (Ed.), The psychobiology of the depressive disorders: implications for 
the effects of stress (pp. 317-334 ), New York: Academic Press. 
Billig, M. & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behavior. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 27-52. 
Blaine, B. & Crocker, J. (1993). Self-esteem and self-serving biases in reactions to 
positive and negative events. An integrative review. In R.F. Baumeister (Ed.). Self 
Esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard. Plenum Press: New York. 
Brewer, M.B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive 
motivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307-324. 
Brown, J.D., Collins, R.L., & Schmidt, G.W., (1988). Self-esteem and direct versus 
indirect forms of self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 
445-453. 
Campbell, J.D. (1990). Self-esteem and clarity of the self-concept. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 59, 538-549. 
47 
Campbell, J.D. & Lavallee, I.F. (1993). Who am I? The role of self-concept confusion 
in understanding the behavior of people with low self-esteem. In R.F. Baumeister 
(Ed.). Self Esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard. Plenum Press: New York. 
Crocker, J. & Schwartz, I. (1985). Prejudice and ingroup favoritism in a minimal 
intergroup situation: Effects of self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 11, 379-386. 
Crocker, J., Thompson, L., McGraw, K., & Ingerman, C., (1987). Downward comparison, 
prejudice, and evaluations of others: Effects of self-esteem and threat. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 907-916. 
Crocker, J., & Luhtanen, R. (1990). Collective self-esteem and ingroup bias. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 60-67. 
Diehl, M. (1990). The minimal group paradigm: Theoretical explanations and empirical 
findings. European Review of Social Psychology, 1, 263-292. 
Ehrlich, H.J. (1973). The social psychology of prejudice. New York: Wiley. 
Epstein, S. (1976). Anxiety, arousal, and the self-concept. In I.G. Sarason & C.D. 
Spielberger (Eds.), Stress and Anxiety (Vol. 3). Washington, D.C: Hemisphere. 
Frey, D. & Carlock, C.J. (1989). Enhancing self-esteem. Accelerated Development Inc.: 
Indiana. 
Gerard, H.G. & Hoyt, M.F. (1974). Distinctiveness of social categorization and attitude 
toward ingroup members. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 836-842. 
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Psyzczynski, T., Rosenblatt, A., Burlig, J., Lyon, D., simon, 
L., and Pinch, E. (1992). Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that 
self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 63, 913-922. 
Hogg, M.A. & Abrams, D. (1988). Social Identifications: A Social psychology of 
intergroup relations and group processes. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hail. 
Kernis, M.H., Cornell, D.P., Sun, C.R., Berry, A., & Harlow, T. (1993). There is more 
to self-esteem than whether it is high or low: The importance of stability of self-
esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1190-1204. 
Kernis, M.H., Granneman, B.D., & Barclay, L.C. (1989). Stability and level of self 
esteem as predictors of anger arousal and hostility. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 56, 1013-1023. 
48 
Kernis, M.H. (1993). The roles of stability and level of self-esteem in psychological 
functioning. In R.F. Baumeister (Ed.). Self Esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard. 
Plenum Press: New York. 
Kleinbaum, D.G. & Kupper, L.L. (1978). Applied Regression analysis and other 
multivariate methods. Massachusetts: Doxbury Press. 
Moreland, R.L. & Sweeney, P.D. (1984). Self-expectancies and reactions to evaluations 
of personal performance. Journal of Personality, 52, 156-176. 
Rosenberg, M. (1979). Conceiving the self. New York: Basic. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rosenberg, M. (1986). Self-concept from middle childhood through adolescence. In J. 
Suls & A.G. Greenwald (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol 3, pp. 107-
135). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Savin-Williams, R.C. & Demo, P. (1983). Situational and transituational determinants 
of adolescent self-feelings. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 820-833. 
Seta, C.E., & Seta, J.J. (1992). Observers and participants in an intergroup setting. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 629-643. 
Seta, J.J., & Seta, C.E. (submitted for review) Upward and downward mobility based on 
social comparisons: A social hierarchy analysis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 
Seta, J.J., Seta, C.E. & Donaldson, S. (1991). The impact of comparison processes on 
coactor's frustration and willingness to expend effort. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 17, 560-568. 
Seta, J.J., Seta, C.E., & Donaldson, S.J. (1992). Implications of a resource-investment 
analysis of goal value for performance in audience and solitary setting. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 13, 145-164. 
Shrauger, J.S. & Rosenberg, S.E. (1970). Self-esteem and the effects of success and 
failure feedback on performance. Journal of Personality, 38, 404-417. 
Shrauger, J.S. (1975). Responses to evaluation as a function of initial self-perceptions. 
Psychological Bulletin, 82, 581-596. 
Suls, J. & Wills, T.A. (1991). Social comparison: Contemporary theory and research. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Pub. 
. ~ 
~ 
f. 
49 
Swann, W.B., Griffin, J.J., Predmore, S.C. & Gaines, B. (1987). The cognitive-affective 
cross-fire: When self-consistency confronts self-enhancement. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 52, 881-889. 
Swann, W.B., Jr. (1983). Self-verification. Bringing social reality into harmony with the 
self. In J. Suls & A.G. Greenwald (Eds.), Social psychological perspectives on the self 
(Vol 2, pp. 33-66). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Tajfel, H. (1959). Quantitative judgment in social perception. British Journal of 
Psychology, 50, 16-29. 
Tajfel, H. (Ed.) (1978). Differentiation between social groups, London: Academic Press. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W.G. 
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, 
CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, S.E., & Brown, J.D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological 
perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210. 
Tennen & Herzberger (1987). Depression, self-esteem, and the absence of self-protective 
attributional biases. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 72-80. 
Testa, B. & Major, B. (1990). The impact of social comparisons after failure: The 
moderating effects of perceived control. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 11, 205-
218. 
Tice, D.M. (1991). Esteem protection or enhancement? Self-handicapping motives and 
attributions differ by trait self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
60, 711-725. 
Turner, J.C. & Oakes, P.J. (1989). Self-categorization theory and social influence. In 
P.B. Paulus (Ed.), Psychology of Group Influence. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Turner, J.C. (1981). The experimental social psychology of intergroup behavior. In J.C. 
Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup Behavior. Oxford, England: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Watson, D., & Clark, L.A. (1984). Negative affectivity: The disposition to experience 
aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 465-498 . 
50 
Wills, T.A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychology. Psychological 
Bulletin, 90, 245-271. 
Wylie, R. (1979). The self-concept. (Vol. 2). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Zuckerman, M. (1960). The development of an adjective check list for the measurement 
of anxiety. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 457-462. 
Zuckerman, M. & Lubin, B., (1965). Manual for the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist. 
Educational and Industrial Testing Service, San Diego. · 
APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
51 
I 
~ 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Overall Sample 
Stability of Self Esteem 
Spring 1990 Fall1990 Spring 1991 
N=360 N=313 N=240 
Mean 3.49 3.47 3.41 
SD 1.28 1.40 1.35 
Median 4 4 4 
Mode 3 5 4 
Skewness -.868 -.847 -.760 
Level of Self Esteem 
Spring 1990 Fall1990 Spring 1991 
Mean 31.69 31.31 31.53 
SD 5.10 5.03 4.94 
Median 31 31 32 
Mode 31 30 32 
Skewness -.350 -.681 -.348 
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Table 2 
Evaluations of the Ratings of Importance to have Personally Performed Well on the Task 
as a Function of Task Feedback, Self-Esteem, and Task Importance. 
High Self-Esteem 
Low Self-Esteem 
Failure 
Success 
Failure 
Success 
Task Importance 
Important 
4.93 
5.76 
5.04 
5.20 
Unimportant 
5.11 
4.35 
4.09 
5.68 
Note. The scale ranged from not at all important (1) to very important (7). 
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Table 3 
Evaluations of the Ratings of Importance for Group to have Performed Well on the Task 
as a Function of Task Feedback, Self-Esteem, Stability of Self-Esteem, and Task 
Importance. 
Stable LSE 
Failure 
Success 
Unstable LSE 
Failure 
Success 
Unstable HSE 
Stable HSE 
Failure 
Success 
Failure 
Success 
Task Importance 
Important Unimportant 
4.75 
5.63 
4.13 
4.00 
3.36 
5.17 
4.25 
4.20 
3.00 
4.00 
2.92 
4.92 
4.50 
4.29 
3.88 
4.69 
Note. HSE=high self-esteem; LSE=low self-esteem. The scale ranged from not at all 
important (1) to very important (7). 
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Table 4 
Evaluations of the Ratings of Accuracy ofTaskAssessment as a Function of Task Feedback, 
Self-Esteem, Stability of Self-Esteem, and Task Importance. 
Stable LSE 
Failure 
Success 
Unstable LSE 
Failure 
Success 
Unstable HSE 
Failure 
Success 
Stable HSE 
Failure 
Success 
Important 
1.75 
3.63 
2.13 
2.67 
1.91 
3.17 
2.69 
3.20 
Task Accuracy 
Unimportant 
1.60 
3.29 
1.58 
3.33 
2.17 
1.86 
1.88 
2.92 
Note. HSE=high self-esteem; LSE=low self-esteem. The scale ranged from not at all 
accurate (1) to very accurate (7). 
Table 5 
Evaluations of Groups as a Function of Task Feedback. 
Failure 
Success 
Own 
14.32 
23.34 
Note. The higher the number,. the more positive the evaluation. 
Other 
16.78 
20.34 
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Table 6 
Evaluations of Groups as a Function of Self-Esteem. 
High Self-Esteem 
Low Self-Esteem 
Own 
18.34 
18.25 
Note. The higher the number, the more positive the evaluation. 
Other 
19.90 
16.57 
57 
Table 7 
Evaluations of Groups as a Function of Task Feedback. 
Failure 
Success 
Above 
20.65 
26.23 
Note. The higher the number, the more positive the evaluation. 
Below 
12.14 
4.66 
58 
Table 8 
Evaluations of Groups as a Function of Task Feedback and Self Esteem. 
High Self-Esteem 
Low Self-Esteem 
Failure 
Success 
Failure 
Success 
Above 
21.16 
29.10 
20.02 
23.21 
Note. The higher the number, the more positive the evaluation. 
11.51 
10.73 
12.91 
-1.72 
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Table 9 
Mean Evaluations of Minimal and Conceptual Ingroups and Outgroups as a Function of 
Task Feedback and Self Esteem. 
High Self-Esteem Low Self-Esteem 
Minimal Group 
Failure 15.76 16.52 
Success 24.97 18.46 
Conceptual Group 
Failure 16.34 16.47 
Success 19.92 10.74 
Note. The higher the number, the more positive the evaluation. 
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Table 10 
Mean Evaluations of Minimal Group as a Function of Stability of Self Esteem and Task 
Feedback. 
Failure 
Success 
Stable 
17.39 
21.23 
Note. The higher the number, the more positive the evaluation. 
Unstable 
13.71 
22.54 
62 
Table 11 
Evaluations of the Ingroup for the Minimal and Conceptual Group Situations as a Function 
of Task Feedback, Stability of Self Esteem, and Level of Self Esteem. 
High Self-Esteem Low Self-Esteem 
Stable Unstable Stable Unstable 
Minimal Group 
Failure 15.13 9.44 . 18.61 14.67 
Success 25.07 27.54 17.79 22.29 
Conceptual Group 
Failure 13.03 9.39 12.94 12.89 
Success 27.93 31.62 23.20 23.21 
Note. The higher the number, the more positive the evaluation. 
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Social Security N:>.-
Please read each statement below and circle the response that 
best describes how you feel. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Be sure to respond to each statement. 
Does your opinion of yourself tend to change a good deal. or does 
it always continue to remain the same? 
1 Changes a great deal 
2 Changes somewhat 
3 Changes very little 
4 Does not change at all 
Do you ever find that on one day you have one opinion of yourself 
and on another day you have a different opinion? 
1 Yes, this happens often 
2 Yes, this happens sometimes 
3 Yes, this rarely happens 
4 No, this never happens 
I have noticed that my ideas about myself seem to change very 
quickly. 
1 Agree 
2 Disagree 
Some days I have a very good opinion of myself; other days I have 
a very poor opinion of myself. 
1 Agree 
2 Disagree 
I feel that nothing, or almost nothing, can change the opinion I 
currently hold of myself. 
1 Agree 
2 Disagree 
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Please read each sta:tarent below and circle the response that best describes 
heM you feel. You are to strongly agree ( SA ) , agree ( A ) , disagree ( D ) , 
or stralgly disagree ( SO ) • Be sure to respond to each statenent. 
1. Ql the wrole, I am satisfied with myself. SA A D 
2. At times I think I am no cp::d at all. SA A D 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. SA ]1_ 0 
4. I am able to do things as ~11 as nest other 
people. ~- A 0 
s. I feel I do not have rru::h to be proud of. ~. A 0 
6. I certainly feel u.c:eless at t.im:!s. SA A D 
7. I feel that I'm a persal of 'WOrth, at least on 
an equal plane with others. SA A 0 
a. I wish I could have nora respect for myself. SA A D 
9. ·All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am 
a failure. SA A D 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. SA A 0 
so 
so 
so 
so 
so 
so 
so 
so 
so 
SD 
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Using the scale below, rate the extent to which each of the 
following words reflect ~ feelings at this moment now. 
1 •••••••• 2o 0 0 0 0 0 0.30. 0 0 0 0 0 o4o 0 0 0 0 0 0 .5o 0 0 0 0 0. o6o ••••• 0 0 7 
not at all very characteristic 
characteristic of how I feel 
of how I feel 
kind tolerant 
cooperative mad 
afraid frightened 
cold hesitant 
angry disagreeable 
efficient conforming 
fearful nervous 
careful proud 
calm flexible 
appreciative silly 
amiable resourceful 
honest alert 
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Using the scale below. rate the extent to which each of the 
following words reflect ~ feelings at this moment ~-
1 ..••.••• 2 •.•••••• 3 •••••••• 4 •••..... 5 ••.••.•. 6 ...•.... 7 
not at all very characteristic 
characteristic of how I feel 
of how I feel 
afraid frightened 
active energetic 
angry disagreeable 
respectable generous 
fearful nervous 
guiet modest 
calm cooperative 
undecided grateful 
amiable superstitious 
forgetful impulsive 
mad sociable 
warm shy 
~
i 
' 
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This experiment involves being a member of a group. There 
are two groupe -----Group A and Group B. You are a member of 
Group Group membership was determined by chance from 
your selection of a letter as you entered the experiment. Some 
of the people in this room as well as people in other sessions 
are also members of your group. There are approximately eight 
members in each group. 
You and your group have been given a symbol task. This task 
has no implications for personal abilities. It is not related to 
abstract reasoning ability or overall intelligen.ce. It is an 
activity often given as a filler when there is extra time in 
experiments. We are giving the task today to see what people 
think of it. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
At the top of the sheet of paper there are 4 target symbols. 
Then listed below those 4 symbols are several rows of randomly 
arranged symbols which includes the 4 target symbols and 10 other 
different symbols. You are to count the total number of times 
the 4 target symbols appear in a row. You are to write on 
the blank line at the end of the row the total number of symbols 
you counted in that row. They can appear in an order. 
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You will then go to the next row, count the number of times 
the 4 target symbols appear totally in that row, and write the 
number down at the end on the blank line. Make sure there is only 
one total number down for all of the 4 target symbols. You will 
continue this until I tell you to stop. 
Please work as quickly yet as accurately as you can. A 
score on this task will consist of how accurately you count the 
number of target symbols in each line and how many lines you 
complete. 
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TARGET SYH&OLS. ARE ,,.,~, AND C 
ttsxe••••at•!tts?&X?t&s•tmmt?e?&~tsscst•ttctt9saxt•ssxs&c?ac ·----
••xaxar•cxtt!t&&x&·scxatt•t•se!etxx•?&-s<9!Xc•tscs·-,•c••·••-----
-••••csams-a•t?m•m&&*?XC?tlx·?t•?asx&•t•txsss?9tt•xx·?!?*·*•-----
caftx•?·eatt?mt&t&tm•·a??*t&c·tec!tttsxrsc~cx!acsx!s?emc•a!e! ____ _ 
t8a?C?t%1!*tiC*II%CtCI•t•&t91t!!l??CICII*ttlt%?199t9!*9flt•? ____ _ 
t&ts&tstee·,•••••·xc•e?&GI?~•e&?t!X*&tst?&X?*??-!9xxs•-••!xs ____ _ 
?tc-aaaetl**'*-•xt9sce?&s?s*?&<txtsst!&t<&t•cx-?-•exces?s%tt ____ _ 
t~I-I*I&Ct&CI*&t•tct!C%?%*<tti?I*&G!I!!t•&•?sc-!91%?1?Ctt!C? ____ _ 
aecs?c?·es·smxac-seax·?cs!t!&X&ttle••sxexx·tc!?%%%&*·•sx~ces ____ _ 
fl?%?a?&ll%?*1%11C?%*9*tiCtttii%1S!%%tC•??%t!&l-cC&l%t?•?&?1-----
*<?l*t**Ct*•&a%•••t&•!C!tl?t&Stt*l*?9••tC9X*ti!C%%1?991%%CCt ____ _ 
asxt•ts·•·•,•••x•xet9t&<!<*'''''*-''.**X'9*sxt•c?-s9?1 !&zx·•-----
**'x~c-·t•sste•t9a-cc••-esxcsecttts!ecrx--e-*tes~xxsxee-x·ts ____ _ 
•ttz&cs<!l%%-s?t&•es-xca?xsxe?cs-c&setxtt•c·s-asc?·c?&?·sxtl-----
e•e&tt&st•ces!?txte•·c·c-•sct·s-cci*<*X!tt•at•exs•sxlts&cte? ____ _ 
ttaee?ti?-&X??Ie&•ecttll-?e•xststx•s•·taxsxa-xts-sstX?**&Xee ____ _ 
?x·?-tT?.?X&tecxct••*'*-cl&<&<cecctt•s?x-xcax-ea-c•xs!?t?*''-----
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This experiment involves being a member of a group. There 
are two groups -----Group A and Group B. You are a member of 
Group membership was determined by chance from 
your selection of a letter as you entered the experiment. Some 
of the people in this room as well as people in other sessions 
are also members of your group. There are approximately eight 
members in each group. 
You and your group have been given the Berkley Abstract 
Reasoning Task. otherwise known as the BART. This task was 
developed to assess abstract reasoning ability and overall 
intelligence. The BART has been found to be a reliable indicator 
of people"s ability to process abstract symbols and integrate 
information to make perceptual judgements. The BART also 
assesses overall intellectual ability. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
At the top of the sheet of paper there are 4 target symbols. 
Then listed below those 4 symbols are several rows of randomly 
arranged symbols which includes the 4 target symbols and 10 other 
different symbols. You are to count the total number of times 
th·~ 4 target symbols appear in a row. You are to write on 
the blank line at the end of the row the total number of symbols 
you counted in that row. They can appear in an order. 
You will then go to the next row. count the number of times 
the 4 target symbols appear totally in that row, and write the 
number down at the end on the blank line. Make sure there is only 
one total number down for all of the 4 tarset symbols. You will 
continue this until I tell you to stop. 
Please work as quickly yet as accurately as you can. 
A score on this task will consist of how accurately 
you count the number of target symbols in each line and how many 
lines you complete. 
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Eerkley Abstract Reasoning Task 
T~RGET SY"8QLS. ARE ,,.,~, AND C 
10t%11tatlt~lttt?&%?111•tt~t?l?l~tltCtl•ttCftill%tttiXIIC?aC -w--
•s%1%&1•Czttltll%&•sczatt•tat~!lt%%t?&•sc~!%Cii1CI••tt<•t•at •• __ _ 
·••••csa~s-aat?~•~•e•?zc?ttx·?t·?aszaat•t:sss?~••·xx-?t?a·••----­
ca·z•?·aatt?etatate•·a??•sac~t~cttttsxtsc·cx!acsxts?~acaa!tl-----
•ea?C?I%~1ttiCtii%CtCI•t•&tl!t!II??C&CI&Ittll%?tlitl!tlllt•? •• __ _ 
sattlttll~-,•••••·xcae?&l!?~a&&?tt:a&ttt?IX?t??•te:xaa•attxs. ___ _ 
'tc•aaaettaa?a•tzt~•c~?&t?tt?&ct~t&st!&tc&tacx·?-aa:ces?t%!t ____ _ 
. ·. 
tt&•tai&CIICia&t•tcttCZ?ZtCttl?ltllll!ll•&•?tc•telX?I?CttiC?.~---
IICS?C?•tt•te%&C•te&%•?ct!IIIZ&ttllttt%1%%•tct?%%%1t•at%1Cit-----
.l?%?t?ltl%?ttXIlC?XteatlCttttl%11!%%tC•??%t!ll•cc&&Xt?•?&?1.----
8C?Iataacta•a~x·••ta•tcltl?tlttttlt?l••tcl%ttl tc:xs?eea::cct •• __ _ 
osxt•ts·a-s?•••x-xetesactcasc?!ca•st•aaxseasxtac?·ae?t!I&X·a ____ _ 
••aztc•••••••~•tee·ccaa·asxcsectttstectx··e·aoes~~:sxee-x·ts ____ _ 
•ttZICICIIXX•t?lltlt·~c&?XtXI?Ct•casetzstac•a•asc?•c?&?•txtl.---­
llllttllttCII!?I%11t•c•c•ttCI•t•cctacazttt•ataex&a&XItiiCtl?-----
ttlil?f!?.lX??I~lliCitll.?lt%111t%tlt•t&XI%l•%tt•ttl%?ll&%2~----­
?%•?•t??•?XltiC%Ctttl!t•ctlCICCICCtt•s?X•zc&X•Q&·caztl?l?tl!.----
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You have been given the result of how you and your group 
performed on the task. The next sheet contains the results for 
your group and instructions on how to interpret those results. 
Although your score 1~ accurate, the interpretation may be 
unreliable as this task has not been found to be indicative of 
abstract reasoning and overall intelligence. 
Following the task result sheet are some additional measures that 
would be helpful in interpreting our research results. Before we 
go on to the next part of the experiment, I would like you to 
read the instructions at the top of the page following the task 
results and write a response for each trait on that page. When 
you have completed that page go on to the next. Do not flip 
forward or backwards. Please write a response for ~ trait. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these guestions. We are 
interested in your impressions. 
Please do not spend a lot of time on this ---- work quickly. 
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You have been given the result of how you and your group 
performed on the BART. The next sheet contains the results for 
your group and instructions on how to interpret those results. 
Please read over the results sheet carefully in order that you 
may have a full understanding of performance on this task. 
Following the task result sheet are some additional measures that 
would be helpful in interpreting our research results. Before we 
go on to the next part of the experiment, I would like you to 
read the instructions at the top of the page following the task 
results and write a response for ~ trait on that page. When 
you have completed that page go on to the next. Do not fliP 
forward or backwards. Please write a response for each trait. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are 
interested in your impressions. 
Please do not spend a lot of time on this ---- work quickly. 
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TASK RESULTS: 
Subject number: __________ _ Group: __________ _ 
Your group's average score, including your own, was in the 
percentile. This means that --------~% of the peQple 
who have taken this task did better than your group. 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE RESULTS: 
The above score is baaed on the total number of symbols correctly 
identified in the amount of time allowed. 
The average score on the task is in the 57th percentile. 
A UNC-G students• average score is in the 63rd percentile. 
PERCENTILES 
0-30 
40-70 
80-100 
·"' 
Below average. On the average this group is 
lacking in the ability to identify quickly and 
accurately abstract symbols. This inadequate 
abstract reasoning ability may be indicative of 
cognitive and intellectual deficits among the 
group members. 
Average. On the average, this group has 
reasonable ability in identifying quicklY and 
accurately abstract symbols. This indicates 
adequate intellectual and abstract reasoning 
ability. 
Above average. On the average, this group is 
intelligent and conceptual. Ibis indicates 
superior ability in abstract reasoning and 
intellectual situations. 
Choose a number from the following scale to indicate how 
characteristic you think the following traits are of you. 
COOose a number for· ~ trait. 
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1 ••••••••• 2 ••••••••• 3 ••••••••• 4 ••••••••• 5 ••••••••• 6 •• 4 ••••••• 7 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Motivated: 
Ambitious: 
Boring: 
Creative: 
Rude: 
Stupid: 
Self-centered: 
Friendly: 
Sincere: 
Insensitive: 
Trustworthy: 
Apathetic: 
Uninformed: 
Considerate: 
Intelligent: 
Incompetent: 
Extremely 
Characteristic: 
' i! ;. 
. . 
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Choose a number from the following scale to indicate how . 
characteristic you think the following traits are of members of 
Group B. If you are not sure, give your best guess to indicate 
what you think the most typical member of Group B would be like. 
If you are a member of Group B, only rate the other members, 
excluding yourself. :eooo.se.. a numbe:t. for ~ tra:Lt. -
l •••••• a •• 2 ••••••••• 3 ••••••••• 4 ••••••••• s ......... & ••••••••• 7 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Motivated: 
Ambitious: 
Boring:, 
Creative: 
Rude: 
Stupid: 
Self-centered: 
Friendly: 
Sincere: 
Insensitive: 
Trustworthy: 
Apathetic: 
Uninformed: 
Considerate: 
Intelligent: 
Extremely 
Characteristic 
·• 
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Choose a number from the following scale to indicate how 
characteristic you think the following traits are of members of 
Group A. If you are not sure, give your best guess to indicate 
what you think the most typical member of Group A would be like. 
If you are a member of Group A, only rate the other members, 
excluding yourself. Choose anumber·for~·tra.it. ·' 
1 ••••••••• 2 ••••••••• 3 ••••••••• 4 ••••••••• 5 ••••••••• 6 ••••••••• 7 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
Motivated: 
• 
Ambitious: 
Boring: 
Creative: 
Rude: 
Stupid: 
Self-centered: 
Friendly: 
Sincere: 
Insensitive: 
Trustworthy: 
Apathetic a 
Uninformed: 
Considerate: 
Intelligent: 
Incompetent: 
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Choose a number from the following scale to indicate bow 
characteristic you think the following traits are of people who 
score above average on thi~ ~K- _ If you are not sure, give 
your best guess or indicate what you think the most typical person 
who scores above averaqe on th'L~ To..sK would be like. Gxx>se a· number 
for -each ~t. 
1 ••••••••• 2 ••••••••• 3 ••••••••• 4 ••••••••.• 5 ••••••••• 6 .•••••••• 7 
Extremely Extremely 
Oncharacteriatic Characteristic 
Motivated: 
Ambitious: 
Boring: 
Creative: 
Rude: 
Stupid: 
Self-centered: 
Friendly: 
Sincere: 
Insensitive: 
Trustworthy: 
Apatheticz 
Uninformed: 
Considerate: 
Intelligent: 
Incompetent: 
1 
I 
~ 
j 
f. 
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Choose a number from the following scale to indicate bow 
characteristic you think the following traits are of people who 
score below average on this iusK. If you are not sure, give 
your best guess or indicate what you think the most typical person 
who scores below average on this to.s~ would be like. ctx:>ose a- -n~r 
for~ trait. 
1 ••••••••• 2 ••••••••• 3 ••••••••• 4 ••••••••• 5 ••••••••• 6 ••••••••• 7 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Motivated: 
Ambitious: 
Boring: 
Creative: 
Rude: 
· Stupid: 
Self-centered: 
Friendly: 
Sincere: 
Insensitive: 
Trustworthy: 
Apathetic: 
Uninformed: 
Considerate: 
Intelligent: 
Incompetent: 
Extremely 
. Characteristic 
I 
i\ 
J 
r: 
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We would like to aeeeee your reaction to the score you and your 
group obtained on the task. Your groupe· performance (including 
yours) fell within the -------- percentile. This means that 
________ % of the people who have previously done this task have 
performed better. This task may --------------------------------
among group members. 
Using the scale below, rate the extent to which each of the 
following words reflect your feelings at this moment ~· 
1 ••.••••• 2 •••••.•• 3 •••••••• 4 •••••••• 5 •••••••• 6 •••••••• 7 
not at all very characteristic 
characteristic of how I feel 
of how I feel 
afraid 
active 
angry 
respectable 
fearful 
quiet 
calm 
undecided 
amiable 
forgetful 
mad 
warm 
frightened 
energetic 
disagreeable 
generous 
nervous 
modeet 
cooperative 
grateful. 
superstitious 
impulsive 
sociable 
shy 
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Please read each question and answer as accurately as possible. 
1. On a scale of 1 to 7 how satisfied are you with your groupe' 
performance. (1 means not at all and 7 means very much). 
2. Was your group's score lower than that of the average UNC-G 
score? ____ __ (true/false) 
3. What percentile do you think your own personal score on this 
task fell within? ------- (0 to 100) 
4. On a scale of 1 to 7, how important to you was it for your 
group to do well on the task? ( 1 means not at all important and 
7 means very important). 
5. On a scale of 1 to 7, how important was it for you to 
personally do well on the task? (1 means not at all important 
and 7 means very important) 
6. On a scale of 1 to 7, how accurate do you think this task is 
at assessing overall intelligence? (1 means not at all accurate 
and 7 means very accurate) 
